Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated Evidence by Sprowl, James A. & Sprowl, James A.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 52
Issue 3 Law and Technology Symposium Article 3
January 1976




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
James A. Sprowl & James A. Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 52 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 547 (1976).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol52/iss3/3
EVALUATING THE CREDIBILITY OF
COMPUTER-GENERATED EVIDENCE
JAMES A. SPROWL*
A neatly printed, computer-generated report can be a highly persuasive
piece of evidence. Such a report has an air of authority comparable to
that of a sealed document. Judges and jurors, knowing very little about
computers, may be awed by such a report. They may feel ill-equipped to
question its credibility, particularly when its credibility is supported by the
testimony of one who purports to be an expert on computers. If a proper
foundation has been laid, such a report will be admitted into evidence.' But
an admissible report is not necessarily credible. Computer-generated reports
can contain errors which can cause such reports to present a distorted picture
of reality. Computers can also be programmed to slant such reports to favor
one party or the other or to tell lies. Computer-stored evidence can be
readily altered, and such alterations are very difficult to detect in a
computer printout.2 In appropriate cases, the trier of fact must be prepared
to inquire into the credibility of such a report, and an attorney must be pre-
pared to initiate or participate in such an inquiry.
In this article, I shall explain how one evaluates the credibility
of such computer-generated evidence. In doing so, I shall draw heavily
upon the experience and expertise of a small group of certified public
accountants who specialize in the examination of computerized accounting
systems.8 The articles which follow, two of which are authored by these
* Research Attorney for the American Bar Foundation and Lecturer at IT/Chi-
cago-Kent and Northwestern University Law Schools; J.D., University of Michigan.
I wish to thank J. David DeHetre, Jerome J. Roberts, and L. Thorne McCarty
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Several recent articles discuss how one goes about establishing the admissibility
of such a report; this article will be confined to the narrower topic of credibility. Of
course, a report that lacks credibility may be inadmissible so the two topics cannot be
completely separated. A concise discussion of computer generated reports is presented
in Younger, Computer Printouts in Evidence: Ten Objections and How To Over-
come Them, 2 LITIGATION 28 (Fall 1975). See also Freed, Fenwick, McGonigal, et al.,
Mock Trial: Admissibility of Computerized Business Records, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 206
(Spring 1975) and Roberts, Practitioner's Primer On Computer-Generated Evidence, 41
U. CmI. L. REV. 254 (1974). An excellent example of how one goes about laying a
proper foundation for computer-generated evidence is presented in United States v.
Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973).
2. In this respect, computers are much like automobile odometers and voting ma-
chines as is discussed in the text infra. If the computer has not been kept secure from
all possibility of tampering it cannot be definitely determined that the information stored
in the computer has not been altered.
3. I am particularly grateful for the assistance I have received from J. David De-
Hetre of Touche, Ross & Co.
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certified public accountants, consider two aspects of this credibility evalua-
tion problem in greater detail. The article by J. David DeHetre describes
the types of safeguards that must be employed to insure the integrity of
computer-stored information, and the articles by Carol Eastin and Martha
Jenkins focus upon the use and reliability of computer models as accurate
simulations of real life systems. We hope that this series of articles will
supply most attorneys with sufficient insight into the nature of computer-
generated evidence to argue intelligently for or against the credibility of a
typical computer printout. But when the credibility of a printout is crucial
to a cause of action, an attorney should consider retaining a certified public
accountant with computer auditing experience to assist in discovery and trial
preparation, just as he or she would retain other types of technical experts in
appropriate cases.
I shall begin by discussing the flow of evidence to the trier of fact, em-
phasizing those features of computer-generated evidence that are unique. I
shall then describe digital computers briefly, concentrating upon their role
as conduits for certain types of evidence rather than their technical details.
Next, I shall explain how one can judge the credibility of the evidence that
flows from a computer by examining what happens to the evidence as it flows
from its source to the trier of fact. Finally, I shall discuss a number of special
problems that can arise when a computer is used to manipulate or simplify
evidence prior to trial, as when it is used to prepare summaries.
THE FLOW OF EVIDENTIARY INFORMATION
Evidence is a form of information. Information, like energy, is an entity
that may take on different forms at different times. Scientists and engineers
have only recently come to recognize this fact, and they now frequently talk
of "information systems" in which the flow of information is studied without
regard to its form or mode of conveyance. 4 Many otherwise complicated
problems become much simpler when considered from this point of view. To
avoid having to explain the complex technical details of computers, I shall
take this approach in the discussion which follows. I shall describe how evi-
dentiary information flows through a digital computer to the trier of fact with-
out describing the computer itself to any significant extent. It is the integrity
of the flow, and not the technical details of the computer through which it
passes, that determines the credibility of computer-generated evidence.
Information, broadly defined, is a pattern-typically one that conveys
meaning to a human.5 The printed characters of a book, the light and dark
4. Claude E. Shannon originated the field of information science when he wrote
his treatise on the mathematical theory of communication in the late 1940's. See C.
SHANNON, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949).
5. For those who are more mathematically inclined, the information content of
a message that consists of a pattern selected from a set of N possible patterns is the
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regions of a photograph, the fluctuations of a radio or telephone signal, and
the arrangement of magnetic impulses on a roll of audio or computer tape
are examples of such meaningful patterns. A pattern that does not convey
meaning is also information, but I shall call such a pattern "distortion". 6 The
hiss in the background of a telephone conversation, the snow in the
background of a weak television picture, the grain in the background of a
photographic enlargement, and the random marks and image deterioration in
a second or third generation xerographic copy are all examples of such
distortion. Distortion obscures and dilutes meaningful information and
renders it more difficult to comprehend.
Evidentiary information is information that flows through time and
space to the trier of fact, and the rules of evidence constitute a judicial
control mechanism regulating this flow. With the possible exception of oral
testimony, evidentiary information is always tangible. It may take the form
of a pattern that appears on a piece of paper, in a photograph, or on a strip
of magnetic tape, for example.
Frequently, a copy of evidentiary information is presented to the trier of
fact in lieu of the information itself. Such a copy is never an exact duplicate
of the original. For example, a photographic print is always more grainy
than the negative from which it is made and frequently does not reproduce
all the highlight or shadow details apparent in the negative. Similarly, a
xerographic copy always contains far more contrast than does the original
from which it is made, and a duplicate sound recording contains far more
background hiss than does the original recording. When a sound recording
is played back through a loudspeaker, the sound that flows from the
loudspeaker is a "copy" of the recorded sound-typically a distorted copy,
since most loudspeakers convert about five to ten percent of the sound
conveyed into distortion. As a general rule, evidentiary information cannot
be copied or conveyed without some loss of meaningful information and some
increase of distortion. There is an important exception to this rule, as I shall
explain shortly.
The "rule for documentary originals" (sometimes called the "best
evidence rule") is a judicial formulation of this general scientific rule.7
logarithm of N. If the logarithm "base two" is taken, the information content of the
message is measured in units called "bits" (an abbreviation for "binary digits"). For
example, a message consisting of a pattern selected from a set of 64 possible patterns
contains six bits of information and can be stored in a memory or storage device capable
of assuming any one of 64 possible states. Such a memory device is said to have a six
bit storage capacity. Id. at 3-4.
6. An information scientist or an electronic engineer will speak of "noise" rather
than distortion. I use the term distortion because attorneys who read early drafts of
this article were troubled and confused by my use of the more technically proper term
"noise."
7. See generally WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1117-1282 (Chadbourn rev. 1972).
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Under the new Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph must be proved by presentation of the origi-
nal whenever a genuine question is raised as to its authenticity.8 Of neces-
sity, exceptions are made if the original is unintelligible to a human. Thus,
because the trier of fact cannot examine the photographic negative directly,
the new rules define both the photographic print and the negative from which
the print is made to be originals. 9 And while there is no special rule
on the subject, all courts permit loudspeakers to be used for the play-
back of sound recordings even though they distort the sound played
back, since the trier of fact cannot comprehend the information contained in
a sound recording without playing it back. Computerized evidentiary
information, whether stored inside a digital computer's memory or outside
the computer on machine-readable magnetic tapes, magnetic disks, or
punched cards, must also be "played back" to the trier of fact-that is,
printed out on paper or displayed on a suitable electronic display device-
before it can be examined. The new Federal Rules of Evidence define such
a printout or display to be an "original" if it accurately reflects the stored
evidentiary information.' 0
As an exception to the above general rule, information that takes the
form of strings of letters or numbers or both may be copied with any desired
degree of accuracy, if one is willing to expend the necessary effort. For
example, a blurry, fourth-generation xerox copy of a typewritten sheet may
be retyped by a skilled typist and thereby restored to its original clarity with
no loss of information whatsoever so long as the typist can distinguish the
individual letters and numbers from each other and so long as the typist's
work is carefully proofed." Digital computers contain only information of
this type, and they possess the ability to recopy that information hundreds
and even thousands of times in the course of processing the information
without altering it in any way. Because computer-stored information may be
accurately copied, such information differs fundamentally from the nonnu-
meric, nonalphabetic information found in a photograph or sound recording
8. FED. R. Evm. 1002, 1003.
9. FED. R. Evm. 1001(3).
10. Id.
11. Typewritten or handwritten strings of letters and numbers may be copied accu-
rately because the shape of the individual letters and numbers can be severely distorted
without making the letters and numbers indistinguishable from each other. The shape
of the individual letters and numbers may be thought of as containing a large amount
of duplicate information much of which can be dispensed with without a loss of mean-
ing. Within a computer, a small amount of duplicate information is added to strings
of letters and numbers to enable the computer to determine when such a string has been
altered and to take corrective action. For example, "parity bits" or "check bits" are small
quantities of information that are routinely added to all computer-stored information so
that copying errors may be detected and corrected. (A full explanation of "parity bits"
goes beyond the scope of this article but may be found in any introductory text on digi-
tal computer design.)
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that cannot be accurately copied. In appropriate cases, the trier of fact will
want to examine a photographic negative to see if it contains highlight or
shadow details not visible in a print made from the negative. On occasion,
the trier of fact will want to examine a magnetic sound recording for visible
evidence of splices or erasures in addition to having it played back. But
nothing is ever gained by physically examining the data storage device of a
computer, since all that is stored within that device is magnetic representa-
tions of numeric or textual information, and these may be printed out on
paper with no loss of accuracy. Similarly, the information content of
magnetic computer tapes, disks, and drums as well as that of keypunched
IBM cards may also be printed out on paper with no loss of accuracy.
Therefore, nothing is to be gained by examining such tapes, disks, drums, or
cards directly. The provision of the new Federal Rules of Evidence defining
a printout of computer-stored evidence to be an original thus has a scientific
basis. The provision of those same rules defining a photographic print to be
an original lacks any such basis and is simply a necessary expedient.
One must not assume that computers are the only entities able to
generate accurate copies of information. The accuracy of a computer
printout is attributable to the purely numeric or alphabetic form of the
information printed out. Handwritten and typed copies of such information
can also be highly accurate, as can oral testimony about such information
when presented by a credible witness.
Digital computers are widely used for accounting purposes at the
present time, and the most common form of computerized evidentiary
information at present is accounting information. Because all accounting in-
formation is numeric in form, such information may be fed into a digital
computer without any alteration whatsoever. 1 2 Computer printouts of ac-
counting information are accurate, generally speaking, although some small
and usually negligible errors can result from arithmetic computations that
are rounded off. More and more frequently, digital computers are being
used for text editing and storage, and thus computerized textual evidentiary
information will become commonplace in the near future. Like accounting
information, textual information may be fed into a digital computer without
alteration, and computer printouts of textual information are extremely
accurate.
Much evidentiary information is neither numeric nor textual in its
original form, and such information must be converted into numeric form
before it can be fed into a digital computer. Industrial process control
computers, for example, measure such nonnumeric things as distances, time
12. Of course, human errors can occur if the accounting information is manually
typed or keypunched into the computer. I shall discuss human errors at a later point.
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durations, pressures, weights, voltages, and currents, all of which may be
relevant to tort litigation. For example, such computers are now used
routinely to monitor the operation of electrical power generating equipment.
If litigation were to result from a massive power failure such as the one that
occurred in New England several years ago, almost all of the evidentiary
information relating to the cause of the power failure would take the form of
computerized records of what events happened at what times and in what
locations. When used in this fashion to gather nonnumeric data, computers
are performing two tasks that traditionally are performed by humans:
making measurements and expressing the results of those measurements in
numeric form.
Regardless of whether such measurements are carried out by a human
or by a computer, the trier of fact should investigate two possible sources of
error. The first is measurement error. Was the measurement equipment
properly calibrated, and was it used correctly? Do repeated measurements
give consistent results?'3  Do measurements carried out with different
equipment give consistent results? 14 And if not, what was the possible range
of error? The second is the error which results when any measurable
magnitude that can take on virtually an infinite number of different values,
such as temperature, is expressed as a number having only so many digits.
For example, if only two digits are permitted, temperature must be expressed
as either 66 degrees or 67 degrees even though the actual temperature may
fall somewhere in between these two values, and the maximum possible
rounding error that results from the use of only two digits is plus or minus
% of a degree.' 5 If three digits are permitted, then temperature can be
expressed as 66.3 degrees, and the maximum possible rounding error is
reduced to plus or minus .05 degree. But if the measurement error is % of a
degree, the use of three digits can give an appearance of accuracy that does
not, in fact, exist.' 6 The trier of fact must consider both of these sources of
13. The degree to which repeated measurements agree with each other is the "pre-
cision" of the measurements. A series of measurements that agree closely are said to
be "precise". But, such measurements may lack "accuracy". See note 14 infra.
14. The degree to which a measurement conforms to some recognized standard
value is the "accuracy" of the measurement. Accuracy is to be distinguished from "pre-
cision", which is a measure of the repeatability of a measurement but not a measure
of its accuracy on an absolute scale. See note 16 infra for an example that illustrates
this distinction.
15. The error which results when a continuous value such as temperature is ex-
pressed as a number having two, three, or any finite number of digits is called "quanti-
zation" or "rounding" error. Simply stated, two digits can define only 100 different
states, and 100 states cannot accurately be used to represent the status of something that
may take on an infinity of different states.
16. It is not uncommon for a measurement to be "precise" (or repeatable) to
within 0.05 units but "accurate" only to within 0.5 units due to improper calibration of
the measuring equipment or other such factors. See notes 13 and 14 supra for defini-
tions of "precision" and "accuracy."
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error and their effect upon the credibility of the evidence submitted in every
case where the validity of such evidence is questioned.
Whenever a human serves as part of the conduit over which evidentiary
information flows, human errors will occur. A witness can mistakenly say
fifty inches instead of sixty inches, for example, or a typist can strike the "5"
key instead of the "6" key and thereby convert the value "60" into the value
"50". Humans are frequently used to enter information into computers, and
human errors are to be found in all computerized information files contain-
ing information entered by humans. The incidence of human errors in such
files can be minimized, but not eliminated entirely, by careful proofreading,
double entry of the same information by different humans, and like proce-
dures. But the cost of eliminating additional human errors goes up rapidly
as the number of undetected errors is reduced, so a small but measurable
number of human errors is simply tolerated as unavoidable in most compu-
terized information files. An error rate of .05 percent, for example, is
considered acceptable in textual information files such as those used for
automated legal research. 17
Computer errors can also occur, but almost all computers contain
elaborate error detection and correction circuits that reduce the computer
error rate to a very low level.' 8 Large computers, for example, rarely ever
alter information without halting immediately or taking other appropriate
remedial action. When evidentiary information is conveyed in part by
humans and in part by computers, the errors attributable to the computers
will almost always be negligible compared to those attributable to the
humans.
To summarize briefly, evidentiary information may be thought of as
flowing through time and space to the trier of fact. Whenever such
information is copied, some meaningful information is lost and some distor-
tion is gained. But information representable by strings of letters and
numbers can be copied accurately if the copying is carefully done, and such
information may also be fed into and through a digital computer without
alteration. Information not so representable can be converted into numeric
form, and then it, too, may be accurately copied and fed through a digital
computer. But the conversion process always introduces some measurement
and roundoff errors. And whenever information is copied by a human,
copying errors invariably result. In most information flow systems, machine
copying errors may be neglected, particularly when human errors are also
present.
17. This figure was supplied by a representative of Mead Data Central, Inc., pro-
moters of the Lexis system of computer-assisted legal research.
18. See note 11 supra. Transmission of information over a telephone or radio
communications link, in the absence of special safeguards, can sometimes cause informa-
tion to be distorted.
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DIGITAL COMPUTERS
As the name implies, a "digital" computer is a machine that contains
"digits" or numbers stored in an internal memory. 19 A digital computer
accepts numbers from the outside world, moves them about, performs simple
arithmetic operations upon them, and ultimately either prints them out on
paper, displays them upon a viewing screen, or supplies them to an external
device that is numerically controlled. When such a computer cannot contain
within its internal memory all of the numbers it is called upon to process, it
typically stores the numbers externally on reels of magnetic computer tape,
spinning magnetic disks or drums, punched IBM cards, or some other
"machine-readable" storage medium.
In a "programmable" digital computer, all operations are controlled by
long sequences of numeric instructions called "programs" or "instruction
sets". These are stored in the computer's internal and external memories
along with the numbers being processed or stored. Pocket calculators and
other so-called "special purpose computers" lack such stored instruction sets
and thus lack the flexibility of a programmable computer. Since the
instruction sets are man-made, they can and frequently do contain erroneous
instructions.
Internally, a digital computer contains and processes only numbers.
Devices external to the computer interpret certain numbers as code represen-
tations for letters, punctuation symbols, and the like. For example, when
the "A" and "B" keys are struck on a keyboard attached to an IBM System
370 computer, the keyboard generates telegraphic codes for the numbers
"42" and "43" and thereby causes these numbers to enter the computer's
memory. 20  The computer may later retrieve these numbers from its
memory and feed them to a printer, which responds by actuating the type
bars carrying the letters "A" and "B." Hence, the number "42" represents
the letter A within the system 370 computer, and the number "43" represents
19. "Analog" computers do not contain digits or numbers-they are inherently
nonnumeric. Analog computers represent pressures, distances, weights, and other such
real-world variables by electrical "analogues"-voltages and currents. An analog com-
puter is thus a simulation or model. It can be used to great advantage to simulate non-
numeric phenomena such as the vibrations of an airplane wing or automobile suspen-
sion, but is never used to store numeric or textual data and does not generate evidentiary
information of the type discussed in this article. An analog computer could be used
to simulate the stability of an airplane wing in tort litigation, so the comments on simu-
lation and modeling presented at the end of this article are relevant to such computers.
20. Programming experts will recognize that the numbers "42" and "43" are not
ordinary decimal numbers but "hexadecimal" numbers. The decimal number system in-
cludes only the ten digits zero through nine. The hexadecimal number system is similar
but includes sixteen digits instead of ten-typically, the ten digits zero through nine plus
the six letters A through F. Hence, "FF" is a valid hexadecimal number that corre-
sponds to "255" in the usual decimal number system. Hexadecimal numbers are used
by computer programmers because they simplify the task of man-computer communica-
tion.
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the letter B. It is possible for the computer to print out the numbers "42" and
"43" instead of the letters A and B, and such a printout would be
unintelligible except to a computer expert. As a dilatory tactic, a party
might produce such an unintelligible printout in response to a discovery
request. ,No judge should countenance such a response. When printed out,
computer-stored information should always be intelligible, with all numbers
in decimal form (not in octal, hexadecimal, binary, or some other strange
form) and with all special computer codes for letters and other symbols
eliminated and replaced by the letters and symbols themselves. 2' Such an
intelligible printout can almost always be produced with little more effort
than it takes to produce an unintelligible printout.
Sometimes a party will request a "machine-readable" copy of computer-
stored information so he can process the information further on some other
computer. Unlike a printed copy, a "machine-readable" copy is an exact
copy of the numeric information stored within the computer-it is not
normally intelligible. The requesting party should supply the necessary
magnetic tapes, magnetic disks, or IBM cards to the party controlling the
information, and the controlling party should have his computer copy the
requested information onto the supplied storage medium. It costs very little
to copy information in this manner, since the information does not have to be
rearranged. The requesting party may then reorganize the information, at
his own expense and using his own computer, if he desires to do so.
Computer programs or instruction sets are written out by computer
programmers in special programming languages such as Fortran and Cobol.
The original or "source" version of a program typically includes many
helpful explanatory comments placed there by the programmer to make the
program more understandable. This source program is typed directly into
the computer's memory by the programmer or else it is punched into IBM
cards which are then fed into the computer. In response to a discovery
request, it is this original or "source" program that should be produced,
regardless of whether the request is for a printed or machine-readable copy
of the program. Once established within a computer, the source pro-
gram may be readily printed out on paper or copied onto some machine-
readable storage medium such as IBM cards, magnetic tape, or the like that
can be delivered to the requesting party.
The source program is not, however, used to control computer opera-
tions. The computer translates the source program into a purely numeric
form called the "object" program, and the object program is then used to
21. See Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 3 C.L.S.R. 138 (D.C. Minn. Nov.
15, 1971), where one party's discovery efforts were hampered by an unintelligible print-
out. The "octal" number system includes only the eight digits zero through seven,
unlike the commonly used decimal system that includes the ten digits zero through nine.
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control the computer.22  The final object program does not include any
explanatory comments, and its purely numeric form makes it very difficult to
follow. The object version of a program should never be produced in
response to a discovery request unless it is specifically requested, and the
production of an object version of a program unaccompanied by a source
version should be considered nonresponsive.
Information other than programs is normally typed into a computer
either directly or through the intermediary of punched cards or magnetic
tape. More and more frequently, ways are being found to enter information
into a computer without typing and therefore without the possibility of
human errors. For example, almost all bank checks and many credit cards
now bear magnetically encoded characters which can be scanned by magnet-
ic sensors. Optically scannable bar codes are also coming into widespread
use on such diverse things as freight cars and grocery products.
A computer used by industrial concerns to monitor temperatures,
pressures, distances, time durations, weights, voltages, and the like and to
control industrial machinery is called a "process control" computer. A
process control computer is equipped with special measuring devices that
generate numbers proportional to the temperatures, pressures, etc. being
measured. The numbers so generated are periodically fed into the comput-
er's memory. To control industrial machinery, such a computer generates
numbers indicative of the desired control action. These numbers are fed
into special numerically controlled devices that open and close valves, start
and stop motors, and perform other necessary control operations. In most
respects, a process control computer is similar to other forms of program-
mable digital computers, but evidentiary information taken from such a
computer is subject to measurement and rounding off errors, as explained
above, and these potential sources of error must be considered by the trier
of fact in appropriate cases.
Computers rarely ever malfunction in such a way as to alter the
information they are processing without warning the operator or taking some
form of corrective action. Because computers are mechanically reliable, the
trier of fact may generally assume that computerized evidentiary informa-
tion has not been altered by a malfunction of the computer circuitry, and in
most instances the mechanical integrity of the computer will not need to be
The "binary" number system includes only the two digits zero and one, and it is used
internally by all digital computers. The hexadecimal number system is described in note
20 supra.
22. Computer scientists do not use the term "translate" in this context. Instead,
they talk of "compiling" a Fortran or Cobol program into "object code." Many com-
puter scientists write their programs in machine-oriented languages called "assembly"
languages, and assembly language programs are "assembled" into object code. The ac-
tual translation is carried out by the computer under the control of a special program
called a "compiler" or "assembler," depending upon its function.
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investigated either in discovery or in open court. But even when a computer
is functioning perfectly, computer-stored information can be altered by the
programs or instruction sets that control the computer. Computer-stored
information can also be altered by a human who has direct access to the
computer within which, or the tapes, disks, or cards upon which the informa-
tion is stored. Whether or not done intentionally, such alterations typically
leave no traces behind, and they are difficult to detect. Computers, voting
machines, and odometers all share a common vulnerability to tampering
because the tampering can be carried out quickly without leaving any telltale
indications behind. In contrast, it is very difficult to tamper with a bank
check without leaving smudges or other indications. Bank checks may
therefore be freely circulated with minimal fear that they will be altered,
while computers and computer-stored information must be kept secure from
tampering at all times. Herein lies the principal vulnerability of all comput-
er-stored evidence. If a computer is not secure from all possibilities of
tampering, then it cannot be said for sure that the information stored within
the computer has not been altered. Similarly, it cannot be said for sure that
information stored on magnetic computer tapes or disks or punched into
IBM cards has not been altered unless the tapes, disks, or cards have been
kept in a secure place at all times.
DETERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TAKEN
FROM A DIGITAL COMPUTER
When evaluating the credibility of computer-generated evidence, one
should examine the flow of the evidentiary information into, through, and
out of the computer. At the point of entry into the computer, if the
information was nonnumeric, it had to be converted into numeric form, and
the conversion process may have introduced significant measurement and
rounding-off errors. If the information was entered into the computer
manually, as through keypunching or typing, the manual processing steps
may have introduced human errors. Thus, one must carefully study the way
in which the information entered the computer to determine how serious
these errors may be.
Once within the computer, information is moved about and ultimately
printed out under the control of computer programs. To insure the credibili-
ty of the information, it must be demonstrated that the programs are
functioning properly and are free from errors. It must also be shown that no
unauthorized programs were permitted to control the computer, since such
programs could have altered the information. It must be demonstrated that
unauthorized persons, particularly adverse parties, could not gain access to
the computer or to the information itself while stored away from the
computer in machine-readable form. Finally, it must be established that the
information actually presented to the trier of fact is an accurate copy of the
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computer-stored information, and the information should not be accepted
simply because it is presented in the form of an authoritative-looking
computer printout.
The most likely point along the information flow path for errors to
occur is at the point where information first enters the computer. Most
frequently, computerized information originates in bills or invoices that are
handwritten. Keypunch operators or typists extract certain information from
these invoices, such as dollar amounts and account numbers, and manually
feed this information into a computer. Other useful but nonnumeric infor-
mation is not fed into the computer. For example, the shape of signatures is
not computerized, and any evidence of forgery is not computerized. When
such nonnumeric information is relevant to a courtroom proceeding, the
original invoices should be presented to the trier of fact rather than a
computer printout. Microfilm copies of the original invoices will usually
suffice if the original invoices have not been saved, but such copies may not
be adequate for signature identification or forgery detection. If numerous
invoices are involved, the trier of fact can examine a randomly-selected sam-
ple of the invoices to conserve time.
If the information is manually typed or keypunched before it enters the
computer, the human error rate will always be greater than zero. In most
properly run computer installations, procedures are followed to detect and
correct most but not all such human errors, as I have explained. Sometimes
data processing personnel neglect to follow such procedures even when they
are supposedly in effect. Numerous errors can result from such neglect, and
the credibility of any information processed under such conditions is highly
questionable. The trier of fact should be informed of the actual error rate, if
it is known. The past error experience of the computer installation is good
evidence of the actual error rate, and so is the theoretical number of errors
that one would expect to result from use of a given manual information entry
procedure. In some instances, actual error checks may have to be carried
out to determine the human error rate.
When humans are not involved in typing or keypunching information
into a computer, the likelihood of input errors is greatly reduced. A
department store, for example, can print price and inventory information
onto individual price tags using a machine-readable bar code, and they can
issue magnetically encoded badges to their employees and magnetically
encoded credit cards to their customers. A cash register of the conventional
type is then not needed. At the checkout counter, the store employee inserts
his or her badge and the customer's credit card into a magnetic scanner and
then draws a special light sensing pen across each price tag. In this way the
customer charges are recorded without error, and an accurate inventory
turnover record is captured at the same time. Since transactions of this type
generate computer stored information directly without any intervening writ-
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ten record, a computer printout of such information should always be
accepted as an "original". But errors can result from use of the wrong card,
errors or defects in the magnetically or optically scannable codes, and from
failure of an employee to follow the proper procedures. Controls are also
needed to prevent the occurrence of unauthorized transactions or the nonre-
cording of authorized transactions, and the presence or absence of such
controls affects the credibility of this type of evidence.
Once information has been entered into a computer or is stored on a
computer information storage medium such as magnetic tapes, magnetic
disks, or punched cards, the information is moved about and copied under
the control of computer programs. These will sometimes instruct the
computer to alter the information. Large data processing installations
contain hundreds and sometimes thousands of such programs, each contain-
ing anywhere from a few to a thousand or more individual instructions.
Erroneous instructions are frequently found within these computer programs,
particularly the more complex types of programs. Computer programs are
written out by "computer programmers" in much the same way that a book
is written out by its author, and computer programs are corrected in much
the same way that a book is proofread. Except in the case of very simple
programs, it usually takes longer to correct a program than it takes to write
the program in the first place. Frequently, a computer program is placed
into operation before all of its errors have been found, and sometimes errors
are uncovered months or even years after a program is first put into service.
Such undetected errors can cause a program to alter the information stored
within a computer, and the alterations may be difficult to detect. The only
way to insure that a computer program is operating properly is to test it
thoroughly. If the programs in a computer have not been thoroughly tested,
then there is no assurance that the information processed by the computer is
accurate. Before trial, a party who must rely upon computer-generated
evidence should verify that all the programs that processed the evidence
have successfully processed test information without altering it and without
malfunctioning. Long and satisfactory use of a program in an environment
where errors will quickly be brought to the attention of management, as by
customers complaining about improper billings, can create a presumption
that a program is free of programming errors, and such a showing may be
sufficient to establish the credibility of evidentiary information processed by
that program. 23
23. Offering evidence of a lack of previous complaints as proof of a computer pro-
gram's lack of errors is analogous to the offer of evidence in negligence and products
liability cases of the absence of other accidents as proof of a safe situation. The trend
of recent decisions seems to favor the admissibility of this type of evidence. The main
objection to the admissibility of such evidence in accident cases has been that the per-
sons passing safely did not expose the allegedly defective condition to the same use or
test of its integrity as did the injured party who was suing. That objection has less
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Computer-stored data may be altered intentionally. A skilled pro-
grammer who understands a given computer system and has direct access
to the system can alter the data stored within the system, leaving no
trace of the alteration. To protect against such alterations, a variety of
safeguards-too numerous to be listed here-are required, particularly when
large sums of money are involved. The accompanying article by Mr.
DeHetre describes these safeguards. Through experience gained in working
with a wide variety of computerized accounting systems, CPA computer
experts like Mr. DeHetre have gained insight into the types of safe-
guards required to insure the integrity of a given type of computer
installation. One standard rule that all computer-wise auditors insist upon,
for example, is that skilled programmers should never be permitted near the
computer. They should always be required to submit their programs to others
whose sole function is to supervise the actual computational equipment. As
an additional safeguard, almost all well-run data processing installations keep
an accurate log of what programs are run and at whose request. These are
just two of many safeguards that are possible. Some companies conduct
audits of their electronic data processing systems at regular intervals to insure
that the necessary safeguards are continuously in effect. Without such
safeguards, one can never be certain that computerized information has not
been altered. With such safeguards, there is still a possibility that the
information may have been altered. The possibility, however, is greatly
reduced, and the cost of the consequences that could result from the
alterations still possible are less than the cost of adding further safeguards to
the system. In other words, the safeguards employed will be those that are
cost effective. In any installation, some desirable safeguards from the point
of view of the trier of fact will not have been implemented simply because
they did not prove themselves to be cost .effective.
Another factor the trier of fact should consider when evaluating the
credibility of evidence processed by a digital computer is who has custody of
the computer. If the computer is under the control of one party and the
computerized evidence is submitted by the opposing party to support the
opposing party's position, there is little likelihood that the evidence will have
been altered, since the party controlling the computer will see to it that the
evidence is accurate. Similarly, data obtained from a computer controlled
by an impartial third party is not likely to have been altered. But when a
party introduces evidence taken from his own computer, the situation is
much the same as when the party is testifying before the court himself. A
party against whom such evidence is presented should be given wide latitude
to investigate the credibility of the evidence, and any indication that the
weight in the computerized data processing environment. There, the computer programs
make exactly the same set of data manipulations over and over and are not subject to
gradual deterioration but remain constant. See McCoRMIcK, EvmmcE § 200 at 476
(2d ed. 1972).
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proper safeguards are absent from the computer should be taken as an
indication that the party proffering the evidence at least had the opportunity
to alter the evidence while it was under his control. In the absence of
adequate safeguards, it is just as easy to lie with a computer as it is to lie
with oral testimony. Hence, self-serving computer statements should always
be subject to close scrutiny.
The final factor which warrants consideration is the way in which
computer-generated evidence is conveyed from the computer to the court-
room. It is tempting for the court to focus too much attention upon the form
of the evidence at this point and too little attention upon the safeguards that
have been taken to insure its accuracy. For example, in North Carolina v.
Springer,24 the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected oral testimony to
the effect that computerized records indicated $1,209.63 worth of purchases
had been made with a stolen credit card because, the court held, the dollar
amount should have been proved by means of the "best evidence"-in this
case, a computer printout.25 In so holding, the North Carolina court made
two errors. First, the court held a printout of computer-stored credit card
records to be admissible as the "best evidence" even though such records are
incomplete insofar as they do not accurately depict the signatures and other
nonnumeric features of the original transaction records. The court should
have insisted upon in-court production of the original credit card invoices.
Second, the court elevated an ordinary computer printout to the status
of a signed contract by refusing to accept computer-generated evidence
offered in any other form. While a computer printout might be preferable
in a case where the information is voluminous, surely a witness can be relied
upon to recite the dollar figure "$1,209.63" to the trier of fact without
having to bring a computer or a printout into the courtroom. In some cases,
it will be difficult or impossible for such a witness to obtain a printout, as
when computer-stored information is displayed upon a display device having
no printer. Insistence upon the production of an actual printout in every case
may thus be unfair.
A computer printout lacks the uniqueness of a signed contract. Any
computer may be readily programmed to print out any desired information
in any desired format, and it is normally impossible to distinguish a genuine
printout of evidentiary information from a fabrication printed at another
time by the same computer and printer. One printout may be readily
substituted for another prior to trial, and there is almost no way that such a
substitution can be detected. The credibility of a printout must, therefore,
be established by a witness who, for example, produces the printout and
asserts that it has been kept in a secure place continuously from the time
when it was printed until it was brought into the courtroom. An even better
24. 283 N.C. 627, 197 S.E.2d 530, 5 C.L.S.R. 432 (1973).
25. Id. at 633, 197 S.E.2d at 536.
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procedure is to have the witness sign the printout immediately after it is
printed and later identify the printout as genuine by reference to the
signature. In the absence of such testimony, no printout should ever be
considered credible except by stipulation. A printout should be regarded as
nothing more than a set of notes that is brought into the courtroom by a
witness to help him refresh his memory and to help him testify about
computer-stored information.
The process of judging the credibility of computer-stored evidence thus
involves four steps: studying the way in which the evidence was entered
into the computer for possible human, measurement, and numeric conversion
errors, and determining the frequency and magnitude of any such errors;
evaluating the instruction sets or computer programs used to process the
evidence to determine whether the programs may have altered the evidence
in any way; investigating the safeguards employed to prevent unauthorized
persons or adverse parties from having direct access to either the computer
or to the tapes, disks, or cards that may have been used to store the evidence
away from the computer in machine-readable form; and judging the credibil-
ity of the witness who conveys the evidence from the computer to the
courtroom. No computer system is ever completely secure, and a thorough
investigation will always raise some doubts about the credibility of any
computer-generated evidence. These doubts should be taken under advise-
ment by the trier of fact.
USING A COMPUTER TO MANIPULATE AND SIMPLIFY
EVIDENCE PRIOR TO TRIAL
In the above discussion, the computer was treated as a conduit through
which evidentiary information flows, hopefully without alteration. Comput-
ers can also be used to manipulate evidentiary information. If the eviden-
tiary information is organized in such a way that it is difficult to understand,
a computer can reorganize it for clarity. If the evidentiary information is
voluminous, a computer can summarize it. If the trier of fact must render a
decision that cannot be properly rendered without specific knowledge of how
some highly complex system or entity functions, a computer may be used to
simulate or model the complex system or entity. These uses of computers to
manipulate evidentiary information should be encouraged, since they make it
possible for the trier of fact to render more intelligent judgments than would
otherwise be possible, and they also save time in the courtroom. Each of
these uses, however, creates its own special problems.
When a computer. is used to reorganize information, it is important to
insure that no information is lost in the process. During trial, an impartial
expert who supervised the reorganization process should demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the judge that no information has been lost. Only one
question needs to be asked of this expert: Can the reorganization be
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reversed and the information returned to its original form? If the reorgani-
zation is not fully reversible, then some information has been lost, and the
information presented in court should be considered a summary and not a
simple reorganization.
Frequently, one party may wish to enter into evidence information
taken from the other party's computer but organized in a special way. In
response to an appropriate discovery request, the other party might refuse to
produce the information, stating that the information is not organized in the
specified way and that it would be costly and "burdensome" to reorganize
the information for production in the form specified. Such an objection may
be valid, but it might also be dilatory. How should this situation be handled?
Perhaps the best thing for the judge to do is order production of the
information without reorganization in both printed and machine-readable
form accompanied by a detailed explanation of how the information is
organized. Such an order should not prove a burden upon the producing
party, for the printed and machine-readable copies are readily generated,
and the producing party should already have a detailed explanation availa-
ble for his own use. The requesting party may then reorganize the
information in any way he chooses, at his own expense and preferably under
the supervision of an impartial data processing expert. 26
Summaries of computerized information are readily prepared by a
computer. Computers are widely used by social scientists for summarizing
and simplifying information, and a number of special computer programs are
available for their use.27 Such programs are used routinely by the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation to process and summarize the results of the Founda-
tion's many empirical studies of law. The Illinois State Bar Association
recently used such programs to summarize the results of its recently
commissioned economic survey of the Illinois Bar.28  Attorneys in private
practice should take advantage of such special programs when faced with the
need to summarize computerized information for courtroom use.
A summary is a condensation. Of necessity, some information is lost
when information is reduced to summary form. A summary of evidentiary
information can favor either party, depending upon what information is lost
and what is retained. Usually, the party who prepares a summary will
attempt to make it favor his own position if he can do so without arousing
26. See United States v. Davey, 404 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
27. For example, SPSS (Statistical Package For The Social Sciences) and DATA-
TEXT are two such programs. N. NiE et al., STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (2d ed. 1975). D. ARMOR ET AL, DATA-TEXT PRMmER-AN INTRODUCTION To
COMPUTERIZED SOCIAL DATA ANALYsIs (1972).
28. Illinois State Bar Association, Economics of Legal Services In Illinois, 64 ILL.
B.J. 73 (1975).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the suspicion or hostility of the trier of fact. A case on point is United States
v. RUSso.
29
The court in Russo permitted the jury to examine a computer-prepared
summary of payments made by Michigan Blue Shield to Michigan doctors
during 1967 for five specific medical procedures. The summary indicated,
for example, that 17,747 payments had been made for a procedure called
"subsequent aspiration of the bursa." 30 Other evidence indicated that 14,141
of these 17,747 payments had been made to the two defendants who operated
a medical clinic in a Detroit working class neighborhood.
The summary evidence thus strongly indicated that the defendants
administered the procedure called "subsequent aspiration of the bursa" far
more times than did an average doctor in the state of Michigan-but the
figure "17,747" was a summary figure, and it was highly prejudicial to the
defendants. Many Michigan doctors undoubtedly do not treat arthritic
conditions at all, and such doctors probably never use this particular
procedure. Additionally, the defendants operated a clinic and had other
doctors working in their employ. They undoubtedly treated far more
patients and applied for far more payments of all types than would a doctor
who practiced by himself. The defendants were also osteopaths and thus
likely to use different procedures than those used by medical doctors. A
properly prepared summary would have taken these and other similar factors
into consideration and would have attempted to account for them. As things
stood, the figure "17,747" probably should have been excluded from evi-
dence, since it was highly prejudicial and not particularly meaningful when
unaccompanied by additional information. As an alternative to requesting
the court to exclude this evidence, the defendants could have made up their
own summary of this same information, manipulating the data to slant it the
other way as much as possible. In the Russo case, there was overwhelming
evidence in addition to this summary that adequately supported the convic-
tion;31 thus the fact that the appellate court did not order a new trial was
"harmless error." But in any similar case where the evidence for conviction
is not so overwhelming, potentially prejudicial summary evidence of this type
should be handled much more carefully by the court.
The defendant in Russo strongly argued that summarized evidence is
inadmissible, and the appellate court was troubled by this argument. But
after acknowledging that summary evidence must be treated with care, the
Russo court noted that the summary in question had been prepared by
Michigan Blue Cross for business and accounting purposes, not specifically
for use in litigation. The court thus held the summary to be admissible
under the shop book exception to the hearsay rule, stating that it was an
29. 480 F.2d 1228, 5 C.L.S.R. 687 (6th Cir. 1973).
30. 480 F.2d at 1236, 5 C.L.S.R. at 696.
31. 480 F.2d at 1232-34, 5 C.L.S.R. at 690-91.
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"original record and not a mere summary"-an absurd holding.32 True, the
summary was an original business record, but it was still a summary and as
such excludable if it proved to be highly prejudicial to the defendants. 33 As
a general principle, a summary exists whenever the volume of information
has been reduced. To determine whether evidence has been summarized,
the court should ask whether the original source of information can be
recreated from the evidence. In Russo, the original computerized billing
records of Michigan Blue Cross could not possibly have been recreated from
the evidence placed before the jury, so the trial court should have investigat-
ed further to determine whether the evidence in summary form was prejudi-
cial to either party.
Computer simulations or models, as described in the articles by Carol
Eastin and Martha Jenkins, can be highly beneficial to the trier of fact,
particularly if they help to illustrate how a complex real-world system
functions. The use of a model or simulation as a teaching tool to help
explain a complex phenomenon is its most useful role in the courtroom. But
like summaries, simulations or models are almost always simplified represen-
tations, and they can prejudice either party by making the other party's
position appear more favorable than it actually is. Modeling and simulation
are particularly risky, since very small errors in the underlying assumptions
that govern a computer model's operation can cause gross errors in the
predictions which flow from the model. For example, an international
organization recently used a computer model to predict that man was headed
for unavoidable disaster during the next 50 to 100 years.3 4 Others quickly
pointed out that the prediction was unduly pessimistic because of some
improvidently selected constants used in setting up the computer model.85
An excellent example of how a computer model may be used to
advantage is presented in a book by Jay W. Forrester. 8 Mr. Forrester uses
a computer to simulate the operation of a city, taking into account its
housing, industrial capacity, population, and the way these factors interact
with each other. He uses his computer model to demonstrate that many of
the things politicians try to do to help a city often contribute to its
deterioration over the long run. For example, Forrester demonstrates that
the building of public housing can greatly speed the deterioration of a city,
32. 480 F.2d at 1240-41, 5 C.L.S.R. at 698-99.
33. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury .... ." FED. R. Evw. 403.
34. D. MEADows et al., THE LiMrrs To GRowTH: A REPORT FOR THE CLUB OF
ROME'S PROJECr ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972), reviewed in McCarty,
Book Review, 8 STAN. J. INT. STUDIES 154 (1973).
35. MODELS OF DOOM: A CRITIQUE OF THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (Cole et al ed.
1973). Saunders, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: An Examination of the
Controversy over the Limits to Growth, 9 STAN. J. INT. STUDIES 45 (1974).
36. JAY W. FORRESTER. URBAN DYNAMcs (1969).
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although one would expect the opposite result. He does not pretend that his
computer model is an accurate representation of the dynamics of a city.3 7
Instead, he uses the computer as a teaching tool that enables his reader to
follow the workings of an extremely complex phenomenon-one that would
be very hard to follow without computer assistance. One should never
assume that the predictions of a computer model are any more accurate than
the assumptions underlying its operation, and one should always remember
that those assumptions are usually simplified in comparison to the real world
system that is being simulated by the computer.
SUMMARY
Judges and attorneys do not have to become technical experts before
they can handle computer-generated evidence. All they need to do is
carefully trace the flow of the computerized evidentiary information from its
source to the courtroom, concentrating upon the accuracy of the information
rather than its form or the technical complexities of the computer through
which it passes. Technical experts who testify in court about such evidence
should be instructed to describe what happens to the information without
explaining the technical complexities of the computers through which the
information passes, just as I have dohe in this article, so that their testimony
will be more understandable to all courtroom participants,
Attention should be focused upon the way the evidentiary information
enters the computer, since most human errors occur at that point in its flow
path. In addition, if the information originates as direct measurements of
distance, time and the like, the magnitude of any significant measurement
and roundoff errors should be considered. Attention should also be focused
upon the reliability of the programs that move the information about within
the computers, since program errors can adversely affect the credibility of
the information processed. Also, the safeguards that prevent adverse parties
from gaining access to a computer or to the evidentiary information when it
is stored away from the computer should always be reviewed to determine
the likelihood that such a party might have altered the information, if he had
the inclination or the expertise to do so.
If the evidentiary information is reorganized by a computer prior to the
trial, a check should be made to see if any information has been lost. If
information has been lost, the evidentiary information has been summarized,
and it needs to be checked carefully for any possible bias introduced by the
summarization process. Finally, the assumptions underlying any computer
model or simulation should be checked out with great care to determine the
extent to which they accurately reflect the real-world entity or system that is
being simulated or modeled.
37. A highly critical appraisal of Forrester's Urban Model appears in Ackerman,
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing
Subsidies and Income Distribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1141-43 & n.49 (1971).
